

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 08990

E. O. 11652: XGDS 1

TAGS: PEPR, PGOV, BQG

SUBJECT: BERLIN ASPECTS OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN

REF: BONN 8564 (EXDIS NOTAL)

BEGIN SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO AN FRG BRIEFING IN THE BONN GROUP ON BERLIN ASPECTS OF BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN, THE SOVIET LEADER BLAMED THE FRG FOR THE FAILURE TO CONCLUDE THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AND OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. HE SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT SACRIFICE ITS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE BY ACCEPTING THE FRG POSITION ON THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN IN THOSE AGREEMENTS. HE COMPLAINED THAT SCHMIDT'S PLANNED ACCOMPANIMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND QUEEN ELIZABETH TO BERLIN WAS A "DEMONSTRATIVE ACT" AND NOT GOOD FOR DETENTE. BREZHNEV ALSO SAID THAT THE DIFFICULTIES IN BERLIN HAD BEEN CAUSED BY THE FRG. ON THE WHOLE, HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT HIS MEETINGS WITH CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD MADE HIM "OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT BERLIN.

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THE CHANCELLOR, IN ADDITION TO DEFENDING FRG POLICY AGAINST THESE CHARGES, COMMENDED MAYOR STOBBE'S "CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY" ON BERLIN TO BREZHNEV'S ATTENTION. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT HIS INTENTION TO ACCOMPANY PRESIDENT CARTER AND QUEEN ELIZABETH ON THEIR VISITS TO BERLIN WAS A MATTER OF COURTESY AND NOT AN ACTION

DESIGNED TO GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT WEST BERLIN IS A PART OF THE FRG.

OTHER PARTS OF THE BONN GROUP BRIEFING, COVERED FULLY BELOW, WERE THE INCLUSION OF BERLIN IN THE FRG/ SOVIET COMMUNIQUE AND JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED IN CONNECTION WITH THE VISIT. END SUMMARY

1. AT THE MAY 10 BONN GROUP MEETING, THE FRG REP (VON BRAUNMUEHL) ELABORATED ON POLITICAL DIRECTOR BLECH'S BRIEFING (REF TEL) ON THE BERLIN ASPECTS OF THE BREZHNEV VISIT TO BONN.

SCHMIDT-BREZHNEV EXCHANGES

2. IN SCHMIDT'S FIRST TETE-A-TETE WITH BREZHNEV, THE SOVIET LEADER RAISED THE SUBJECT OF BERLIN AND THE GDR. BREZHNEV SAID CERTAIN CIRCLES WERE PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE BORDERS AND TRYING TO AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION IN BERLIN. (COMMENTS: THE REFERENCE TO "BORDERS" IS AMBIGUOUS, BUT THE FRG BELIEVES HE PROBABLY MEANT THE CONTINUED FRG COMMITMENT TO REUNIFICATION AND ITS CONTINUING REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE THE GDR AS A STATE LIKE ANY OTHER STATE IN RELATION TO THE FRG). THIS WOULD NOT HELP ANYTHING. UNFORTUNATELY, NOT ALL THE POSSIBILITIES TO PROMOTE COOPERATION ON THE BASIS OF

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TREATIES WERE BEING EXPLOITED. THE DIFFICULTIES WERE ALWAYS FROM THE SAME SOURCE. EFFORTS WERE BEING MADE TO FORCE THE USSR TO ABANDON ITS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE AND ACCEPT CHANGES THAT WERE NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE QA. THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENT, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN ON THE TABLE FIVE YEARS. THE USSR WAS NOT AGAINST BERLIN'S INCLUSION UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT THE FRG WAS DEMANDING THAT BERLIN-BASED FRG AGENCIES BE RECOGNIZED BY THE SOVIETS AND INCLUDED IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS THE SOVIETS COULD NOT ACCEPT. IF BOTH SIDES SHOWED A REALISTIC APPROACH, THEN AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. THE FRG HAD REFUSED TO COOPERATE ON CHEMICAL AND AGRICULTURAL MATTERS ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE BASIC FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT, THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENT, HAD NOT BEEN CONCLUDED YET. THIS PRESSURE WOULD NOT WORK.

3. SCHMIDT REPLIED IN PART THAT THE FRG WAS NOT PUTTING PRESSURE ON THE GDR. THE FRG HAD HELD NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GDR ON MANY ISSUES, AND "ONE SPOKE NOWADAYS OF A MEETING BETWEEN SCHMIDT AND HONECKER."

NOTE BY OC/T: DISSEMINATION COORDINATED WITH S/S-O, KENNEDY.

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THE FRG NEITHER SOUGHT ADVANTAGES IN BERLIN NOR A CHANGE
IN THE CITY'S STATUS.

4. AT THEIR SECOND ONE-ON-ONE MEETING, SCHMIDT SPOKE
INTER ALIA OF MAYOR STOBBE'S "CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT."
HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR STOBBE'S REMARK AT A RECENT PRESS
CONFERENCE IN BERLIN THAT THE "REALITIES" IN BERLIN
SHOULD BE RESPECTED BY EVERYONE. STOBBE HAD ALSO
STATED THAT BERLIN WAS NOT A CONSTITUENT PART OF THE
FRG. SCHMIDT RECOMMENDED TO BREZHNEV THAT STOBBE'S
POLICY BE TREATED SYMPATHETICALLY.

5. BREZHNEV, IN ADDITION TO THE REMARKS REPORTED IN
REF TEL, REPLIED THAT IT WAS SAID THAT THERE WERE
DIFFERENCES OF INTERPRETATION OF THE QA. THE WORDING
OF THE QA, HOWEVER, WAS CLEAR. HE POINTED OUT THAT
THERE HAD BEEN NO DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSIT MATTERS.
THIS WAS BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET OBLIGATION IN THE QA
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AND THE GOOD WILL OF THE GDR. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT THE CHANCELLOR'S REMARKS FILLED HIM WITH "OPTIMISM."

6. ON SCHMIDT'S PLANNED ACCOMPANIMENT OF PRESIDENT CARTER AND QUEEN ELIZABETH TO BERLIN, BREZHNEV COMMENTED THAT IT WAS A DEMONSTRATIVE ACT AND NOT GOOD FOR DETENTE. IT WAS SOMETHING WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN BERLIN.

7. SCHMIDT REPLIED THAT "OPTIMISM" WAS A GOOD WORD. HIS ACCOMPANIMENT OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE QUEEN TO BERLIN, HOWEVER, WAS ONLY A COURTESY AND SHOULD NOT BE PLAYED UP.

HAMBURG TALKS AND GENSCHER-GROMYKO SESSIONS

8. VON BRAUNMUEHL HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REPORTS ON THE HAMBURG PORTION OF THE VISIT, NOR ON THE ONE-ON-ONE MEETINGS BETWEEN GENSCHER AND GROMYKO. HE PROMISED TO BRIEF THE BONN GROUP ON THESE AS SOON AS HE RECEIVED ACCOUNTS OF THEM.

COMMUNIQUE

9. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT, DURING THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COMMUNIQUE IN MOSCOW, THE FRG HAD SUGGESTED A FORMULATION EXPLICITLY COMMITTING THE TWO SIDES TO MAKE PROGRESS ON VARIOUS BERLIN ISSUES, IN PARTICULAR THE AGREEMENTS ON CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION. THIS HAD BEEN STRONGLY RESISTED BY THE SOVIETS IN THE PERSON OF BONDARENKO, THE HEAD OF THE THIRD EUROPEAN DEPARTMENT IN THE MFA. BONDARENKO HAD SAID THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD QUITE CLEAR IDEAS ABOUT THE REASONS
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FOR THE DIFFICULTIES IN BERLIN, IMPLYING THAT THE FRG WAS TO BLAME.

10. VON BRAUNMUEHL POINTED OUT THAT THE COMMUNIQUE, AS RELEASED, DID NOT MENTION BERLIN SPECIFICALLY. ALTHOUGH THE FRG HAD NOT ASKED THAT THE COMMUNIQUE CONTAIN THE PETERSBERG FORMULA, THE FRG DID WANT A BRIEF REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD EXCHANGED VIEWS ON BERLIN. THE SOVIETS HAD SAID THAT SUCH A REFERENCE WAS NOT NECESSARY, BECAUSE BERLIN WAS

MENTIONED IN THEIR JOINT DECLARATION, A MUCH MORE
IMPORTANT DOCUMENT.

11. VON BRAUNMUEHL COMMENTED THAT BERLIN WAS NEVERTHE-
LESS COVERED BY THE TERMS OF THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE IN
THE COMMUNIQUE: "THE TWO SIDES HELD AN EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ON QUESTIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE TREATY BASES (AUSBAU DER VERTRAGLICHEN GRUND-
LAGEN) OF BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING EXISTING AS
WELL AS NEW PROJECTS FOR AGREEMENTS IN CONCRETE AREAS.
THEY AGREED TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF THESE
QUESTIONS." UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN BONN, VON BRAUNMUEHL
SAID, THE SOVIETS HAD GIVEN THIS TEXT TO THE FRG. IT
WAS SIMILAR TO AN ALTERNATIVE VERSION OF A BERLIN
PASSAGE WHICH THE FRG HAD SHOWN THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW.

JOINT DECLARATION

12. DURING TALKS ON THE JOINT DECLARATION IN BONN
BETWEEN AMBASSADOR FALIN AND STATE SECRETARY VAN WELL,
FALIN HAD COMMENTED THAT GROMYKO WAS QUITE INVOLVED IN
BERLIN POLICY AND THAT HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH

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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS. FALIN HAD ALSO SAID THAT GROMYKO WAS NOT FLEXIBLE. IN DISCUSSING THE SCIENTIFIC-TECHNICAL AGREEMENT, FALIN HAD REITERATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENTS OF BERLIN-BASED FRG OFFICES IN BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE SOVIETS WHEN SUCH ACTIVITIES WERE HELD IN THE FRG. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AGREE TO THEIR TAKING PART IN MEETINGS IN THE SOVIET UNION. FALIN SAID THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO REACH AGREEMENT. VON BRAUNMUEHL COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD MADE THIS PROPOSAL BEFORE; THE FRG REJECTED IT.

13. VON BRAUNMUEHL POINTED OUT THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE HAD BEEN SOME DIFFICULTIES, THE SOVIETS FINALLY AGREED THAT ARTICLE IX OF THE DECLARATION SHOULD CONTAIN THE FULL TEXT OF THE PETERSBERG FORMULA, AND NOT JUST THE PASSAGE ABOUT "STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL CONFIDENTIAL

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IMPLEMENTATION" OF THE QA. (ARTICLE IX READS: "THE TWO SIDES REITERATED THEIR VIEW THAT THE STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 3, 1971, REMAINS AN ESSENTIAL PREREQUISITE FOR LASTING DETENTE IN THE CENTER OF EUROPE AND FOR AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CORRESPONDING STATES, IN PARTICULAR BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE SOVIET UNION.") VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME SINCE BREZHNEV'S VISIT TO BONN IN 1973 THAT THE TWO SIDES HAD PRODUCED A JOINT PAPER INCLUDING THE FULL TEXT OF THE PETERSBERG FORMULA, IE. INCLUDING THE PORTION LINKING BERLIN AND DETENTE. THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED TO USE THE PHRASE "STRICT OBSERVANCE AND FULL APPLICATION" ONCE SINCE 1973, BUT NOT THE FULL TEXT. VON BRAUNMUEHL NOTED THAT THE PHRASE "CORRESPONDING STATES" ALSO INCLUDED THE GDR AND THE OTHER EUROPEAN STATES, EAST AND WEST.

14. VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID IT WAS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT, IN A DISCUSSION OF THE DECLARATION, FALIN HAD SAID THAT A FURTHER PASSAGE ON BERLIN WAS NOT NEEDED, BECAUSE BERLIN WAS INCLUDED UNDER ARTICLE II. (THIS READS IN PART: "...THEY WILL WORK TO SEE THAT ALL THE PRINCIPLES AND PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT OF CSCE SIGNED IN HELSINKI ARE FULLY REALIZED IN THE RELATIONS AMONG ALL THE PARTICIPATORY STATES AND THROUGHOUT EUROPE...") VON BRAUNMUEHL SAID THAT THE ALLIES HAD ALWAYS UNDERSTOOD THE PHRASE "THROUGHOUT EUROPE" TO BE A REFERENCE TO BERLIN, BUT THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME HE KNEW THAT THE SOVIETS HAD TAKEN THE POINT.

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